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Cabranes: International Law by Consent of the Governed

INTERNATIONAL LAW BY CONSENT OF THE
GOVERNED
José A. Cabranes*
I. INTRODUCTION1
These days we hear more about “international law” than usual,
especially in political discourse and the national press. We are informed, in
the heat of political combat, that the pellucid terms of international law
have been flagrantly violated or, on the contrary, that international law does
not exist or is largely a concoction of rogue regimes acting in concert.
These oversimplifications would be harmless enough but for the fact
that they affect public opinion and have significant real-life consequences in
our national and international politics. The contemporary interest in
international law has been stimulated by the phenomenon of
“globalization”—a fashionable, overarching term that embraces a multitude
of international trends in trade and telecommunications. Skepticism about
international law has been the inevitable consequence of the sheer breadth,
and more-then-occasional indeterminacy, of a body of law that potentially
touches virtually any private or public transaction affecting more than one
nation-state. The skepticism engendered by the problem of defining and
delimiting “international law” is reinforced by the grandiose claims for a
seemingly unlimited body of law asserted, especially in the last generation,
by a combination of scholars and activists who include proponents of a
world order in which national sovereignty yields to norms elaborated by
supranational organizations.

*
United States Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit. A.B., Columbia College; J.D., Yale
University Law School; M. Litt. (International Law), University of Cambridge. Prior to his
appointment to the federal bench, Judge Cabranes served as General Counsel of Yale
University. He was active in the work of several international law societies and he served as
Special Counsel to the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and head of the
Commonwealth’s office in Washington, D.C. He has been elected to membership in the
Council of Foreign Relations and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
1
I am grateful to the Dean and Faculty of the Valparaiso University School of Law for the
invitation to deliver the 2006 Indiana Supreme Court Lecture, which afforded me the
opportunity to reflect on timely aspects of customary international law. In this lecture, I
expand on themes developed earlier in the year in the Jon O. Newman Lecture at the
University of Hartford, an endowed lectureship established in honor of my friend and admired
colleague, Judge Jon O. Newman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
These reflections rely in some measure on the jurisprudence of the Court on which I am
priviliged to serve, including decisions which I have written or in which I have participated. I
would also like to thank my law clerks Bryan Leach, Jonathan Goldin, Michael Jacobsohn, and
Anisha Dasgupta for their editorial comments and assistance.
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Naturally, proponents of varying conceptions of international law have
taken their causes not only to the press and the political rostrum but also to
the courts, where litigation involving private parties, as well as nation-states
and foreign public instrumentalities, regularly brings before our judges
questions arising under bilateral and multilateral treaties and, significantly,
claims under “customary international law.”
In attempting to remain above the political fray, judges face their most
serious challenges when asked to recognize and apply this “customary
law,” which is an outgrowth of the historic interaction of states in a world
community of nearly 200 sovereign states. These are challenges for which
most of us are understandably ill-prepared, because such situations
invariably require judges to decide cases with little or no guidance from
positive law adopted by democratically-elected legislatures. As a corollary,
such situations present judges with unequaled opportunities to decide cases
on the basis of personal inclinations. By presenting judges with
opportunities to decide cases free of the restraints of positive law, cases
asserting claims under customary international law are an open invitation
to judges to adopt the style of common law judges—suddenly we are
wearing the toga of Blackstone or Lord Mansfield as we decide cases by
roving freely across the terrain of modern history and international politics.
In the nature of things, such judicial decisions, if wholly unmoored from
our domestic democratic processes, will raise serious questions about the
legitimacy of the judicial power being asserted—questions that no amount
of instruction on judicial independence can or should silence.
Thus, it seems to me desirable to try to explain—in a way that invokes
basic guiding principles rather than grandiose pronouncements, even at the
risk of appearing simplistic myself—how in the modern era international
law is used properly and how it can be misused.
II. (MIS)PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Sir Isaiah Berlin once observed that the case against international law,
like the case against historical objectivity, is that “it does not exist.”2
Berlin’s remark captures the first of three widespread intuitions about
international law that I would like to address—namely, that international
law is more of an aspiration than a reality. After all, there is no such thing
as a World Government.3 And even if there were some international body
charged with regularly making “international law” in the legislative sense
Ferenc M. Szasz, The Many Meanings of History, Part II, 8 HISTORY TEACHER 54, 60 (1974).
See infra note 35 and accompanying text (observing that the United Nations General
Assembly lacks law-making ability).
2
3
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of “law,” the challenges of enforcing that law against nation-states would be
formidable.
Second, it may seem to the casual observer that international law is
deeply controversial—a constant source of argument in legal and foreign
policy circles alike. Recent events concerning sensitive issues related to
security and sovereignty illustrate the point. As one example, our
government’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th has
sparked heated debate over whether certain laws of war apply in an
ongoing conflict against Al-Qaeda, a group of non-state actors who
deliberately target innocent civilians.4 As another example, the decision of
the United States under successive national administrations not to ratify the
treaty creating the International Criminal Court has provoked accusations
that Americans consider themselves beyond responsibility for criminal
acts.5
A third popular conception is that international law is a relatively new
phenomenon. We are all reminded regularly that we live in an “Era of
Globalization,” that the world is both “shrinking” and “flat,” and that
nation-states are becoming ever more interconnected and interdependent.
Students learn that it was only in the aftermath of the First World War that
the League of Nations was formed, and it was only after the Second World
War that the United Nations and the European Union were founded. In
light of these Twentieth Century events, it is perhaps natural for many to
regard the development of international law as a product of recent vintage.
I should stress that there is an element of truth to each of the three
notions about international law that I just mentioned. It is true that there is
no comprehensive, definitive code of international law binding on all
nation-states. It is true also that international law at times evokes strident
controversy; and that, in recent decades, international law has indeed
acquired a degree of public prominence previously unknown.
Current discussions of the place of international law in the scheme of
things suggest that it might be useful to try to restate some basic
propositions. I will attempt to do so as I describe briefly (a) where
international law comes from, (b) how it operates in practice, and (c) what
aspects of international law seem to me most problematic today in the
United States—in other words, the uses and misuses of international law.
See generally NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST CENTURY
CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005).
5
See W. Michael Reisman, Learning to Deal with Rejection: The International Criminal Court
and the United States, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 17, 17-18 (2004).
4
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A return to basics necessarily involves great oversimplification, and it is
entirely possible that my restatement of basic principles—which focuses on
the relationship between democratic processes and international law (that
is, whether and how international law reflects the consent of the governed)
—will elicit little more than a yawn of approval reflecting a kind of
informed ennui. If so, I will consider this effort successful. On the other
hand, if this effort at restating basic rules elicits disapproval—if the idea
that consent by sovereign states is a sine qua non of the creation of “law”
rings hollow—I would welcome the opportunity to be informed of what
other bedrock principles govern the development of international law.
I should say at the outset that in our times the term “international law”
can be used loosely to refer to many different concepts, any one of which
could form the subject of a full lecture. For instance, one could choose to
focus on human rights law, international criminal law, private transactions
between citizens of different countries, diplomatic and consular law, or,
indeed, any analysis of legal problems touching on more than one
country—what some call “transnational law.”6
For the purposes of this presentation, when I refer to “international
law,” I refer specifically to public international law, which is chiefly
concerned with the rules, principles, customs, and agreements that nationstates and other international entities accept as having the force of law in
their relations with one another. In contrast to comparative law and private
international law, which involve the domestic laws of two or more countries
and trans-border private disputes, public international law focuses on the
rules that emerge from agreements between states about matters of mutual
concern.
Thus, my concern today is not with a related, and no less controversial,
subject that has made its way into the mainstream media lately—the
asserted propensity of U.S. courts to rely on foreign law when interpreting
the U.S. Constitution and invalidating American statutory law.7 Although
See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2001); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law As Part of Our Law, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 52-53 (2004) (discussing “transnationalist jurisprudence” that avoids
“distinguish[ing] sharply between the relevance of foreign and international law, recognizing
that one prominent feature of a globalizing world is the emergence of a transnational law,
particularly in the area of human rights, that merges the national and the international”).
7
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (stating that, for almost 50 years, the
Supreme Court “has referred to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as
instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual
punishments”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (holding that criminalization of
consensual homosexual sex between adults is unconstitutional, and stating that “[t]he right the
petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many
6
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this practice is similar to the application of international law in that they
both allow ample space for courts to apply common law methodology,
international law is more than an interpretive tool.
Under our
Constitution’s express terms, international law is part of the law of the
United States, deriving its legitimacy from the consent of sovereign states to
be bound by certain rules and helping to order the relations of those states
in ways that are pervasive, if not always evident to the outside observer.
III. ORIGINS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Public international law is not a concept of recent vintage. Its modern
roots lie in the natural law philosophy of Sixteenth and Seventeenth century
Europe. Of particularly enduring influence from that time has been the
work of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), who proposed a body of
law applicable to all people and based on universal values divined from
“religious, moral, rational, and historical reflections.”8 Grotius was among
the first to expound the concept of territorial sovereignty, the principle of
legal equality of states, and the idea of the sea as international territory.
Certain of these principles were later recognized in the Peace of

other countries” and “ [t]here has been no showing that in this country the governmental
interest in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent”). See
generally, Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2005, at A14; Jess Bravin,
Congress May Fight Court on Global Front, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21 2005, at A4.
This practice has engendered opposition not only among commentators, see, e.g., Richard
Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2004, at 40-42; J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
423, 425-29 (2004); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38 CONN. L. REV.
185 (2005), but also in Congress, see, e.g., S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Expressing the sense of
the Senate that judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States should not be based on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions
unless [they] inform an understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution of the
United States.”); H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005) (utilizing the same language as the Senate
Resolution ); cf. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a)(2), Pub. L. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600,
2632 (“No foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the
courts of the United States in interpreting” prohibitions of grave breaches of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions).
8
1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (Ronald F. Roxburgh ed., 3d ed. 1920). Grotius
also emphasized the idea of “jus gentium . . . laws established by consent which look to the
good of the great community of which all or most states are members.” J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 30 (Sir Humphrey Waldock, ed., 6th ed. 1963). Yet Grotius’s conception of consent
was not independent of natural law’s metaphysical underpinnings. See id. at 30-31.
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Westphalia,9 the treaty that ended the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 and
marked the beginning of the modern era in European history.10
In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, the concept of international
law became heavily influenced by a different school of thought—the
“Positivist” school—which emphasized the importance of treaties and
international customs as the main sources of international obligations. The
Positivists distinguished themselves from their predecessors by looking to
the actual practices of states rather than to natural law. By analyzing the
obligations that states had actually undertaken, and how widely these
obligations were recognized and respected, the Positivists were able to
identify a set of rules that could be called “international law.”11
The early and permanent imprint of the Positivist approach to
international law can be clearly seen in the constitutional history of the
United States. As early as 1796, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that,
“[w]hen the United States declared their independence, they were bound to
receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”12
In fact, the Constitution expressly recognized two different kinds of
international law. First, it recognized the kind of international law that is
made by agreements or treaties among nations. Second, it recognized the
kind of international law that arises from long-standing practice and
custom. This brand of international law has since come to be known as
“customary international law.”
The Framers provided that treaties would be part of the “supreme Law
of the Land,”13 but specified that, in order to enjoy that venerated status,
treaties must be ratified by the President with the advice and consent of the

See Hedley Bull, The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations, in HUGO
GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 65, 75-78 (Hedley Bull et al., eds., 1990); Leo Gross,
The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 21-25 (1948).
10
See generally, BRIERLY, supra note 8; L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Sir Robert
Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). On the treaty of Westphalia, see HERBERT
LANGER, THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR (Blandford Press, 1980); C.V. WEDGWOOD & ANTHONY
GRAFTON, THE THIRTY YEARS WAR (2005).
11
Indeed, it is the great Positivist Jeremy Bentham who is credited with coining the term
“international law” to replace “the law of nations” in 1789. M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the
Fashioning of “International Law”, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (1984).
12
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.).
13
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
9
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Senate.14 The authority to bind the United States to a treaty was vested in
part in the executive branch and in part in the legislative branch precisely
because treaties were akin to contracts between sovereign nations—and
therefore were not perfectly analogous either to the formulation of law, the
main function of the legislative branch, or to the implementation of law, the
main function of the Executive.
As Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers:
The power of making treaties . . . . relates neither to the
execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the [enactment] of
new ones . . . . Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign
nations, which have the force of law, but derive it from the
obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by
the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between
sovereign and sovereign. The power in question seems
therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong,
properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive.15
But treaties were not the Framers’ sole area of international concern.
Our Constitution also specifies that “Congress shall have Power. . . . [t]o
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations . . . .” 16 This is a reference to a body of
customary international law.
Thus, international law was not introduced to Americans or to
American law in the Twentieth Century, either as a byproduct of the First
World War and Wilsonian internationalism, or as a byproduct of the Second
World War and the United States’ membership in the United Nations. On
the contrary, concepts of international law were quite familiar to the
founders of the American Republic—so much so that they were woven into
the fabric of our Constitution. Consequently, it was possible for Chief
Justice John Marshall to write in 1815 that “the [Supreme Court] is bound by
the law of nations, which is part of the law of the land.”17
Of course, since the founding of the United States, the actors and
actions that we regard as relevant to “international law” have broadened
14
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur . . . .”).
15
THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (P. Ford ed., 1895).
16
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 1 & 10. On the meaning of “the law of nations” in the early
Republic, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-15 (2004).
17
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
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substantially. In particular, the Twentieth Century has brought about a
range of international organizations, such as the United Nations and its
many specialized agencies (for example, the World Health Organization
and the Food and Agriculture Organization), as well as supranational
institutions, such as the European Union.
In addition, as a direct result of Nazi atrocities and the defeat of the
Axis Powers, international law increasingly has concerned itself with the
basic rights of individuals, and not merely the rights and duties of nationstates in their interactions with one another. As a result, we have seen in the
past sixty years international agreements designed to address various
human rights concerns—such as the U.N. International Covenant on
Political and Civil Rights18 and the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination19—both of which have
been ratified in whole or in part by the United States.20
IV. THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES AND UNCONTROVERSIAL USES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Insofar as the evolution of international law has threatened to encroach
upon the traditional prerogatives of the nation-state, it has generated new
and potent controversies. This is well illustrated, for instance, by the recent
debate over the United States’s decision, under both Democratic and

18
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 368 (ratified by the United States June 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
19
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
December 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by the United States Oct. 21, 1994). For a
discussion of this agreement, see LOUIS B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 856-913, (1973).
20
The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1992 subject to certain reservations,
understandings, and declarations. In particular, the Senate specified that “the provisions of
Articles 1 through 27 of [the ICCPR] are not self-executing,” 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-01 (1992),
and “do not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts,” S. Exec. Rep., No. 102-23, at 15
(daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). Accordingly, the ICCPR creates no rights enforceable by individual
suit. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 379 (2d Cir. 2003); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d
118, 135-36 n.8 (2d Cir. 2001). The United States has not ratified either of the Optional
Protocols to the ICCPR. See Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights: Status of Ratification of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at 11,
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. The First Optional Protocol allows the
U.N. Human Rights Committee to consider complaints filed by individuals under the ICCPR.
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, 21, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Second Optional
Protocol provides for the abolition of the death penalty. See Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/44/824 (1989).
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Republican presidents, not to ratify the Rome Statute, which created the
International Criminal Court.21
In light of that decision, some have criticized the United States for
lacking a due regard for international law or for failing to assume
appropriate international responsibilities. Those who defend the U.S.
position have expressed a bipartisan concern at losing control over an
important state decision—namely, the decision whether and on what terms
to prosecute one’s own nationals for alleged crimes.22 This question is, in
the last analysis, a question of politics, not law. Regardless of its merits, the
decision by both the Clinton and Bush administrations not to seek the
Senate’s approval of the Rome Statute illustrates a strong public desire,
across party lines, to preserve what is perceived as an important national
prerogative and to avoid making American officials vulnerable to
international procedures that might camouflage hostility to the policies or
interests of the United States and its allies.23
Yet the emergence of high-profile controversies such as this one should
not cause us to lose sight of the fact that the United States government
routinely generates and complies with international law in the form of
bilateral and multilateral agreements with foreign governments. Although
a few well-known multilateral treaties, not accepted by the U.S., tend to
21
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998
(effective July 1, 2002; U.S. not a party), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999. Under
the outgoing Clinton Administration, the United States signed the Rome Statute on December
31, 2000, the last day it was open for signature; on May 6, 2002, the Government of the United
States notified the United Nations that the United States did not intend to become a party, an
act popularly referred to as “unsign[ing].” Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism:
United States Policy Toward the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 415, 421-22
(2004); see also Peter Slevin, U.S. Renounces Its Support of New Tribunal for War Crimes, WASH.
POST, May 7, 2002, at A01.
22
See Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 420-21 (discussing how the Clinton Administration,
despite being confident that the terms of the Rome Statute on their face were workable,
nevertheless was concerned about “the risk of a runaway court-one that would respond
sympathetically to politically-motivated charges against U.S. nationals”). During a speech
before the Commonwealth Club in September 2002, Al Gore stated that he approved of the
Bush Administration’s decision not to seek ratification of the Rome Statute. See Al Gore,
Former Vice President, Iraq and the War on Terrorism, Answers to Written Questions From the
Floor Following a Speech Before the Commonwealth Club of California (Sept. 23, 2002),
http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-09gore-qa.html (“I thought that this
world criminal court was flawed, and maybe a compromise could have been worked out but I
thought the administration made the right call on that one-a lot of people disagree . . . .”).
23
That the Clinton Administration did not sign the Rome Statute until the latest possible
date, at a time when the prospect of ratification would create political fallout only for the
incoming Republican Administration, see supra note 21, may provide a more partisan example
of the interplay between democratic processes and international law.
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capture the public’s imagination—such as the Rome Statute and the Kyoto
Protocol on Climate Change24—the reality is that the United States abides
by the terms of countless treaties and executive agreements25 that have
entered into force following the action of the political branches of our
government, as prescribed by the Constitution.26
The attention devoted to the Rome Statute and the Kyoto Protocol is
justified inasmuch as our government’s position on whether to ratify these
treaties is a legitimate subject of political debate. But we must always
distinguish between political questions concerning whether the United
States should enter into a particular international agreement and legal
questions concerning the lawfulness of conduct when measured against the
yardstick of existing international obligations. To put it another way: a
question about what obligations the United States should assume under
international law is a political question and one on which the views of the
judiciary are irrelevant.
Moreover, the care and caution with which the United States enters into
treaties is not new. It is the traditional, and virtually unavoidable, care and
caution taken by a country whose Constitution provides an explicit and
honored place for international law—a country that takes the law seriously
and that takes formal international obligations seriously.
It is precisely because the United States takes the law seriously, and takes
seriously the international legal obligations that it assumes, that its leaders
are cautious and careful in their approach to new and complicated
international agreements. Again, this is true regardless of the party in
power. Although the United States is often accused of shirking its
international obligations because of its unwillingness to ratify certain
treaties, reluctance to assume new treaty obligations—whatever those
obligations may be—does not necessarily translate into indifference to
international law. Indeed, I suggest to you that a refusal to ratify a treaty
may indicate quite the opposite; not ratifying a treaty may signal just how
24
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
25
An executive agreement is “an international agreement entered into by the President,
without approval by the Senate, and usually involving routine diplomatic or military matters.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 610 (8th ed. 2004). For example, “[m]aking executive agreements to
settle claims of American nationals against foreign governments is a particularly longstanding
practice.” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003). For a discussion of
congressional attempts to limit the President’s authority to make executive agreements
throughout the latter half of the Twentieth Century, see Louis Henkin, Treaties in a
Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 406, 417-19 (1989).
26
See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Treaties in Force 2005, http://www.state.gov/s/l/
treaties/c15824.htm.
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seriously American administrations, of both major parties, regard the
making of treaties.
The care and caution of the United States in entering into international
agreements is a result of the importance of our country in the international
system and also a result of our abiding commitment to the rule of law.
After all, the less important a state is in the international system the less
consequential it may be whether that state does or does not comply with its
treaty obligations. And it is easy enough for an inconsequential state, and
for authoritarian or totalitarian regimes with no tradition of the rule of law,
to ratify treaties that they will quickly ignore and violate.27 Yet by requiring
that two-thirds of the Senate consent to a treaty before its ratification, our
Constitution ensures that we will not enter into binding legal obligations
unless a broad consensus clearly supports the proposition that such
obligations are both in the national interest and worth risking our national
reputation.
The former Soviet Union famously ratified all manner of international
human rights treaties that it ignored in practice, while it cavalierly
condemned the United States for refusing to ratify some agreements that,
for example, seemed to conflict with American conceptions of free speech.28

27
Oona A. Hathaway’s “large-scale quantitative analysis of the relationship between human
rights treaties and countries’ human rights practices,” Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002), revealed that “[c]ountries with worse
human rights ratings often ratify treaties at higher rates than those with better ratings, and
human rights treaty ratification is often associated with worse ratings than otherwise
expected.” Id. at 2013-14. These results, Professor Hathaway explained, may be traceable to
the following “cross-cutting pressures”:
Countries with worse human rights practices face greater potential costs
of joining a treaty to the extent that they expect it to be monitored and
enforced. But they also stand to gain more from the expression of
adherence to the treaty, particularly where they are under external
pressure to exhibit their commitment to human rights norms. At the
same time, they may have less reputational capital to lose. If countries
with worse human rights practices also have worse reputations for lawabidingness than those with better practices, they may be more willing to
join treaties with which they are not certain they will be able to comply.
Id. at 2013.
Similarly, Professor Hathaway’s analysis seems applicable to a nation-state that lacks
economic, military, or cultural influence, which may benefit from expressing its commitment to
a treaty, while risking relatively little in terms of its pre-ratification capital (reputational or
otherwise) should it fail to comply.
28
See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 360-69 (1993) (discussing disagreements among socialist and non-socialist
countries over restrictions on freedom of speech in the ICCPR); see also Hedrick Smith, Moscow
Ratifies 2 U.N. Covenants on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1973, at 1, 6 (discussing the
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It may also be a simple task for the new government of a developing
country to ratify treaties that it hopes will bolster its reputation abroad and
serve an aspirational purpose at home. For example, after the fall of the
Taliban, Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women.29 Yet without the political will or
material means to make such a treaty anything but a series of empty
promises, disillusionment both with the specific goals of the treaty and with
the general principles of treaty-based law may follow. The United States
historically has not entered into treaties lightly precisely because it strives to
be faithful to the principle that, as Justice Hugo Black wrote, “[g]reat
nations, like great men, should keep their word.”30
Moreover, political decisions declining to join a particular international
agreement remind us of the simple fact that when the United States
assumes treaty obligations, it does so under our democratic processes. As
noted earlier, the Constitution ensures that presidential decisions on treaties
will invariably be affected by the views of the Senate.
It is often forgotten that the Senate, on July 25, 1997, adopted, by a
unanimous vote of 97-0, the Byrd-Hagel resolution. This resolution, cosponsored by the senior Democratic member of the Senate, urged President
Clinton not to submit to the Senate for its consideration the Kyoto Protocol.
This unanimous resolution of the Senate apparently reflected the views of
major constituencies, including organized labor as well as business. In
these circumstances, it should not surprise us that President Clinton
effectively took the advice of the upper house of our democratically-elected
legislature, and that his successor in the White House, President George W.
Bush, did so as well.
Moreover, while some proposed treaties garner substantial attention in
the press because of our government’s reluctance to embrace them—like the
Rome Statute and the Kyoto Protocol—many others, which are ratified by
the United States, deal with mundane matters that one might not typically
associate with international law: for example, the recently ratified Treaty on
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment between the
Soviet Union’s ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR and reporting one U.S. State Department
official as explaining that the United States had not signed the covenants because “they fell
short of the American concept of human rights[,]” for example, the ICCPR “contained
loopholes by which emigration could be barred . . . .”).
29
G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1981), 19 I.L.M.
33 (1980); see also http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm (memorializing
Afghanistan’s ratification of the Convention).
30
Federal Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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United States and Uruguay.31 Thus, we see a continuing commitment on
the part of the American people to law-based international cooperation, not
only in the treaties that we are cautiously reluctant to ratify but also in the
treaties that we embrace and abide by.
V. THE REAL CONTROVERSIES:
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEREMPTORY NORMS
Thus far, I have tried to dispel, or at the very least complicate, the
perception that international law is something new or exotic in the
American system or a byproduct of Twentieth Century “globalization.” I
have also noted that high-profile political controversies regarding certain
treaties tend to overshadow the uncontroversial uses of international law.
In other words, international law is a long-standing framework or process
that governs the interaction of nations and much of it is routine, offering
little to excite the public imagination.
I now turn to what I think is one of the more controversial aspects of
international law today from both a political and legal perspective. The
controversy to which I refer has little to do with the Rome Statute, the
Kyoto Protocol, or any other foreign policy dispute that dominates the
headlines. Instead, it is chiefly about the invocation of “international
law”—and, in particular, “customary international law”—in our courts.
We can all generally understand that international treaties are
agreements pursuant to which the parties (that is, nation-states) expressly
consent to be bound. But “customary international law” is something
different. Roughly formulated, “customary international law” is that law
which results not from an obligation assumed by a state pursuant to a treaty
or other explicit agreement, but rather, from custom—that is, based on the
general and consistent practice of states.
And this is where things get a bit tricky, and where there is a
heightened risk of the misuse of international law. In the world of treaties,
there is a sharp break between the political stage, leading up to ratification,
and the legal stage, that may take place in a U.S. court if a treaty creates
individual rights.32 On the other hand, because customary international law
See U.S. Senate, Treaties Approved by the Current Congress, available at
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legislative/one_item_and_teasers/trty_rtf.htm.
32
See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases) , 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (noting that
a “treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations” and “depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are
parties to it”); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) (“As a general
rule . . . international treaties do not create rights that are privately enforceable in the federal
31

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 5

132

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

is generally not codified in any instrument that one can look to for an
indication of a nation-state’s formal consent, it is easy for courts and
commentators to ignore altogether the role of consent and to blur political
questions with legal ones.
I suggest that consent lies at the heart of the making of customary
international law, just as it does with respect to treaty-based law. The
difficulty lies in reconciling this bedrock principle of consent with the fact
that customary international law is a species of “common law,” in which
judges must discern or identify what the law is.
How does a state consent to customary international law when there
exists no piece of paper to sign and ratify? It does so by affirmative policy
decisions, actions, and practices in the international arena indicating intent
to be bound. In order for a practice to be considered customary
international law, states must universally engage in that practice out of
opinio juris—that is, out of a sense of legal obligation rather than merely as an
act of courtesy or grace.33 Put differently, customary international law
consists of “those clear and unambiguous rules by which States universally
abide, or to which they accede, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual
concern . . . .”34
It is perhaps possible, though highly unusual, for a rule of customary
international law to be restated in a mere declaration or pronouncement by
a group of countries—for example, a resolution of the U.N. General
Assembly or some international conference. Contrary to common
misconception, the General Assembly is not a law-making body;35 and
courts.”); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting the “strong
presumption against inferring individual rights from international treaties”); see also supra note
20 (discussing the ICCPR).
33
See, e.g., Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 307-08 (2d Cir. 2000)
(“Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation.” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added))).
34
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 252 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing CLIVE PARRY, THE
SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965)).
35
See 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 248, 258, 269 (Bruno Simma
ed., 2d ed. 2002) (describing the rejection of proposals to accord General Assembly resolutions
the power to bind member States); D.W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 41
(3d ed. 1975) (cautioning that “any attempt to draw analogies with a national assembly,
parliament or legislature, is apt to be dangerous” and recognizing that General Assembly
resolutions may “become evidence of international law” only “indirectly” and only if they
“embody a consensus of opinion about what the law is . . . .”). See generally Flores, 414 F.3d at
259-61 (“Because General Assembly documents are at best merely advisory, they do not, on
their own and without proof of uniform state practice . . . evidence an intent by member States
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whether such a statement or resolution—by the General Assembly or by
any multinational organization that does not have the power to make law—
accurately reflects a body of “customary international law” will depend on
whether the pronouncement or declaration accurately represents the actual
practice of states in their relations with one another.
General Assembly resolutions and aspirational proclamations of
international conferences, no matter how often repeated, are not in
themselves a source of binding international norms.
As noted,
“international agreements . . . despite their moral authority, have little
utility. . . . ” in defining customary international law.36 To put the matter
more simply and bluntly, zero multiplied 100 times is zero.
Many factors would have to be considered by an observer or judge in
deciding whether a certain pronouncement by a large number of countries
is an authentic statement of a rule of law—including the specificity with
which the principle is articulated; how many and which states have agreed
to the relevant principle; and what, if any, tangible action the states have
taken over time to implement the principle.37
As you might guess from this description, customary international law
has a “soft, indeterminate character”38 and this soft and indeterminate
character can lead to confusion and even to the assertion of international
law where none exists.
Let us take, for example, suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute
(“ATS”), which states that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”39 The
Supreme Court has stated recently that “the law of nations” remains an
“element of common law,” and that federal courts may recognize new
causes of action under the ATS when they “rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
to be legally bound by their principles, and thus cannot give rise to rules of customary
international law.”).
36
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734-35 (holding that provisions of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and ICCPR do not create binding standards of customary international law).
37
See I OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 26-27 (“[T]he substance of this
source of international law is to be found in the practice of states. The practice of states in this
context embraces not only their external conduct with each other, but is also evidenced by such
internal matters as their domestic legislation, judicial decisions, diplomatic despatches, internal
government memoranda, and ministerial statements in Parliaments and elsewhere.”). See
generally Flores, 414 F.3d at 256-57.
38
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 29 (1995).
39
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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comparable to the features of . . . 18th-century paradigms. . . .” such as
piracy and the infringement of the rights of ambassadors.40
Even with this guidance from the Supreme Court, parties to litigation
may disagree over whether a particular rule of customary international law
exists, and therefore whether it can legitimately form the basis for a legal
action. In the event of such a dispute, the role of a judge is to ascertain first
whether a rule of customary international law in fact exists. Secondly, if
such a norm can be said to exist, a judge or jury must decide whether a
party to the lawsuit has violated that law through its conduct.
There are obvious challenges and dangers here—inherent in the role
thrust upon judges to find or discern rules of law based on the examination
of customary international practices or norms. Although this style of
common law adjudication may be familiar in our domestic law, it can have
consequences greater than the “interstitial” development of a state’s
common law of torts and contracts with which we are all familiar.41
Because many judges are unfamiliar with the rarefied and obscure
particulars of international law, they understandably look to the work of
academic commentators on international law for guidance. Indeed, it has
long been understood that the writings of publicists—that is, jurists and
academics—are an accepted source of customary international law, albeit a
secondary or subsidiary source of that law.42
Traditionally, international law scholars played a valuable role assisting
courts by gathering information about the actual practices of states and

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (discussing the possibility of limiting the availability of
relief in ATS suits through a “policy of case-specific deference to the political branches,” and
citing as an example agreement between the governments of South Africa and the United
States that suits against corporations alleged to have participated or abetted in the apartheid
regime would interfere with the policy behind South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission). As famously expressed by Justice Holmes, “judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” S. Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42
See Statute of International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, June 26, 1945,
U.S.T.S. 993 (describing “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists . . . as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law” (emphasis added));
CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1965) (noting that
recourse may be had to secondary sources such as “unilateral declarations, instructions to
diplomatic agents, laws and ordinances, and, in a lesser degree, to the writings of authoritative
jurists,” as evidence of the “acts” and “practice[s]” of states (emphasis added)); see also
Remarks of Jack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion, Scholars in the Construction and Critique of
International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 318-19 (2000).
40
41
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providing that information in the form of reliable secondary sources.43 That
sort of scholarship generally exhibited a descriptive, positivist—and indeed,
what we might call an “empirical”—approach to international law; the
scholars sought to provide accurate accounts of the practices of states. In
short, the historic role of international law scholars was to identify what the
rules of the game were.
Today, scholars of international law are often not content to be mere
compilers of state practices. Instead, many scholars view their role as
advocates or exponents of what the law should be. The problem lies in
conflating this theoretical and policy-driven discourse—which may indeed
influence the political branches of our government to adopt certain practices
that may one day give rise to customary international law—with evidence
of current laws or practices.
It was, I submit, eminently reasonable for courts in years past to rely on
well-regarded positivist accounts as shortcuts for ascertaining customary
international law. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the policy
views of international law scholars have any particular relevance to the
identification of norms that, by definition, can only be established by the
practice of nation-states. When judges or others proclaim “international
law” on the basis of the policy views of professors of international law, they
are engaged, knowingly or unwittingly, in a misuse of the concepts of
international law.
It is essential to recall, as the Supreme Court stated in 1900, that works
of scholars “are resorted to by the judicial tribunals . . . not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for

43
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838 (1997) (“The traditional
conception of [customary international law] was that it resulted from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Several series of works descriptive of the international legal practices of the United States
illustrate this earlier era of scholarship. See, e.g., A DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (Francis Wharton ed., 1886-87) (a U.S. Government compilation of various
official United States documents pertaining to international law); A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (John Bassett Moore ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 1906) (same); DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Green Haywood Hackworth ed., U.S. Government Printing Office 194044) (same); DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Marjorie M. Whiteman ed., U.S. Government
Printing Office 1963-73) (same); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORTS (Hersch Lauterpacht et al.
eds., Grotius Publications LTD) (an analogous compilation of British materials published every
one to four years, formerly under the title ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES ); LAW OFFICERS’ OPINIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE 1793-1860 (Clive
Parry ed., Gregg International 1970-73) (similar).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 5

136

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”44 In other words, as the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed:
scholars do not make law, and . . . it would be profoundly
inconsistent with the law-making processes within and
between States for courts to permit scholars to do so by
relying upon their statements, standing alone, as sources of
international law. In a system governed by the rule of law,
no private person—or group of men and women such as
comprise the body of international law scholars—creates
the law.45
Yet many scholars of international law do not confine themselves to the
seemingly tedious effort to report trends in state behavior. Instead, they
adopt a normative approach, seeking to persuade courts to identify
particular rules that comport with their own normative views.46 These
asserted rules may not necessarily reflect the actual state of customary
international law. Thus, these scholars make the mistake of conflating “the
normative” with “the normal.” That is to say, rather than seeking to
discover “the normal” practice of sovereigns, they approach customary
international law as an inquiry into “the normative” preferences of
educated legal elites.
The phenomenon of scholars attempting to shape law by purporting to
identify existing law is not, of course, unique to international law. It is a
natural consequence of producing scholarly articles and books, and it is also
the result of efforts by “private legislatures,” such as the American Law
Institute (“ALI”), to “restate” the law. Indeed, the proclaimed purpose of
the ALI, it will be recalled, is to “promote the clarification and simplification
of the law and its better adaptation to social needs.”47 In the realm of
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added).
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 102 (2d Cir. 2003); see also id. at 101-02 (discussing
Professor Louis B. Sohn’s claim that “international law is made, not by states, but by ‘silly’
professors writing books”) (quoting Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 399, 399, 401 (1996)).
46
Two leading commentators have suggested that “a major generational change is
underway” in the international law academy. Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New
International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 463, 465 (2005-2006). This “New
International Law Scholarship,” which appears to cut across traditional political boundaries,
“distinguish[es] normative and positive claims,” focuses on empirical scholarship, downplays
doctrinalism, and is “influenced by social scientific theory and, especially, rational choice
theory.” Id. at 482-83.
47
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:
A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS 1 (2001) (quoting the ALI’s 1923 Certificate of Incorporation);
see also Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement Process, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2, 2-3 (2000); Alan
44
45
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international law, as in other areas of the law, restatements are not merely
efforts to “restate” the law as it exists; in fact, the ALI explicitly instructs the
reporters of its various restatements that they are “not compelled to adhere
to . . . a preponderating balance of authority but [are] instead expected to
propose the better rule and provide the rationale for choosing it.”48
The effort to identify what the ALI calls the better rule is, by definition,
a political enterprise, in which competing perspectives, personalities, and
factions vie for the favorable final verdict of a self-selected elite.49
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States (“Restatement (Third)”) is especially interesting because it is an
attempt by the ALI to codify a body of law for a realm that does not have
the advantage of an authoritative legislature50 or a court whose decisions
have the force of binding precedent.51 The innovations of the Restatement
(Third) on the subject of customary international law have been, to put the
matter mildly, controversial. For instance, the Restatement (Third) suggests
that customary international law might trump prior inconsistent statutory
law.52

Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595,
596 (1995) (explaining that restatements “are sets of rules, organized by subject matter, the
content of which is partly a function of the case law but also is a function of the ALI’s collective
view respecting which legal rules are normatively desirable for courts to apply”).
48
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE:
A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS 5 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
49
Id. The ALI, a “self-perpetuating organization of lawyers, judges, and academics,”
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 47, at 596, is a selective “private law-reform group that chooses its
own members,” Id. at 600; see also id. at 597 (arguing that the ALI “produces clear, bright-line
rules that confine judicial discretion commonly when and because dominant interest groups
influence the process” and that “[t]hese bright-line rules ordinarily advance the interest
group’s agenda”).
50
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (illustrating the lack of a centralized system of
enforcement in international law).
51
See, e.g., The Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 59 Stat.
1055, 1062, 3 Bevans 1153, 1190 (“The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103 cmt. b (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (commenting that the “traditional view that there is no stare decisis in
international law”); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN L. REV.
429, 482 (2003) (noting that “even within a single international court there is often no system of
binding precedent and no doctrine of stare decisis,” and concluding that “ [t]he refusal to treat
precedents as binding is a long-entrenched practice in international adjudication that stems
from the origins of the international judicial system in the ad hoc arbitral courts of the
nineteenth century”).
52
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 51, § 115(2) & cmt. d & Reporters’ Note 4. Comment
d states that “[i]t has . . . not been authoritatively determined whether a rule of customary
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Some commentators have called the Restatement (Third)’s view that
customary international law could supersede federal statutory law “pure
bootstrapping,” noting that the only authority cited for that proposition in
the Restatement (Third) is a single law review article by the Restatement
(Third)’s own Reporter, which in turn merely cites an earlier draft of the
Restatement (Third)—that is, the position is without external authority.53
Because the Restatement (Third) itself proclaims that certain of its
positions are “at variance”54 with the practice and customs followed by the
United States in its international relations and incorrectly asserts that
customary international law may trump United States statutory law, a
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has suggested that
courts be vigilant and careful in considering the Restatement (Third), or
other similar scholarship, as evidence of the customs, practices, or laws of
the United States and/or evidence of customary international law.55
The Restatement (Third)’s proposition that customary international law
can preempt or trump domestic legislation is without foundation or merit.
It is also at odds, I believe, with Supreme Court precedent. In the seminal
case of The Paquete Habana,56 the Supreme Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,

international law that developed after, and is inconsistent with, an earlier statute or
international agreement of the United States should be given effect as the law of the United
States.”
53
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 43, at 835-36 & nn.142-43; see also Michael Traynor,
That’s Debatable: The ALI as a Public Policy Forum, Part II, 25 THE ALI REPORTER, 1, 2 (2002)
(noting that the rule was much debated when the Restatement (Third) was under discussion in
the Institute and is not completely free from controversy now).
54
The Director of the ALI notes in the foreword to the Restatement (Third) that it is “in no
sense an official document of the United States,” and that “ [i]n a number of particulars the
formulations in this Restatement are at variance with positions that have been taken by the
United States Government.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 51, at IX. These variations
presumably are intentional because, although the ALI extended the Restatement (Third) project
by a year to consider “communications received . . . from the Department of State and from the
Justice Department,” it did not fully conform the Restatement to the positions expressed in
those communications. American Law Institute, Proceedings, 63d Annual Meeting, 1986, at 90
(1987).
55
U.S v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 99-100 & n.31 (2003).
56
175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations . . . .57
The Supreme Court’s instruction to “resort to” customary international
law only in the absence of a “treaty . . . [or] controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision” reveals a remarkable sensitivity to the
nuanced role that consent plays in international law. The Court understood
that, in abiding by customary international law, which ultimately relies on
policy and practice (implicitly reflecting the consent of the governed), the
United States adheres to its democratic principles.58 But the Court also
realized that—because determination of that consent depends on the
judiciary’s assessment of difficult-to-discern practices and attitudes
worldwide, often filtered through secondary sources that might lapse into
speculation—courts should not risk overturning a clearer manifestation of
those democratic principles embodied in already-existing domestic law.
To put the matter another way, precisely because of the comparative
difficulty of ascertaining the content of customary international law, courts
run a particularly heightened risk of undue reliance on the normative views
of academic commentators when they are called upon to determine whether
there has been a violation of international law. Most significantly, courts
may be asked to apply, as part of domestic law, norms to which the United
States has not consented or, indeed, obligations the United States has
explicitly avoided, rejected, or disavowed.
Id. at 700 (emphasis added). It is illuminating that commentators citing to The Paquete
Habana “generally end at [the first] sentence and go on to assert far-ranging claims for
application of international law in U.S. courts.” Laurence E. Rothenberg, International Law, U.S.
Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 547, 560 (2004); see also Sanchez, supra note
7, at 196-97; see also JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 7
(1996); Koh, supra note 6, at 43.
58
The Court has further indicated its regard for customary international law by holding that
a statute “ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 452 n.14 (White, J.,
dissenting). This interpretive principle was articulated in MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S.
416, 434 (1913):
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the
government to act within the limitation of the principles of international
law, the observance of which is so essential to the peace and harmony of
nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to violate
the obligations of this country to other nations, which it was the manifest
purpose of the President to scrupulously observe, and which were
founded upon the principles of international law.
Yet even here, the Court does not suggest that a statute can be discarded when a court
identifies or recognizes a new rule of customary international law. Allowing courts to nullify
statutes in such a manner would do violence to the view that “judges do and must legislate,
but they can do so only interstitially. . . .” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
57
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A related question is the growing popularity of invocations of so-called
peremptory norms of international law, also known as jus cogens norms. In
essence, a peremptory norm is one that is so fundamental that it binds a
state, even if the state explicitly declines to accept the norm. The
paradigmatic examples of jus cogens norms are collective understandings
that genocide and slavery should be prohibited.59
As one well-known scholar of international law has stated, “there is no
scholarly consensus on the methods by which to ascertain the existence of a
peremptory norm, nor to assess its significance or determine its content.”60
This indeterminancy invites “development” or expansion that ignores the
basic principle that a jus cogens norm must be based on “authentic systemic
consensus” that includes “all the essential components of the international
community.”61 Since the United States is surely an “essential component of
the international community,” it would seem impossible for a new or
additional jus cogens norm to exist that has not been recognized at any point
in the history of U.S. foreign relations or which contradicts the foreign
relations practices of the United States.
Nevertheless, some scholars wishing to help create international law
obligations without regard to the political processes of nation-states have
come to regard the concept of the peremptory norm, or jus cogens norm, as a
useful wellspring for the effectuation of a host of domestic policy goals. The
result has been a proliferation of claimed new peremptory norms, or
expansive definitions of the concept of established jus cogens norms, some of
which have been the basis of claims in domestic lawsuits.62

See generally L. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 10, at 7-8 (“States may, by
and within the limits of agreement between themselves, vary or even dispense altogether with
most rules of international law. There are, however, a few rules from which no derogation is
permissible.”).
60
M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67 (1996) (“Scholars also disagree as to the means to identify the elements
of a peremptory norm, to determine its priority over other competing or conflicting norms or
principles, to assess the significance and outcomes of prior application, and to gauge its future
applicability in light of the value - oriented goals sought to be achieved.”)
61
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 39 (1995) (quoting 2 Y.B.
INT’L L. COMM. 119 (1976)).
62
See, e.g., Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 2002) (“ [T]here appears to be no
basis for granting . . . federal habeas relief on the grounds that imposition of the death penalty
for crimes committed while a juvenile would violate jus cogens norms of international law.”);
Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 373-74 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting argument that imposition of the
death penalty alone is a violation of jus cogens norms); Gisbert v. U.S. Atty Gen., 988 F.2d 1437,
1448 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim that detention of excludable aliens whose native country
would not accept them back was a violation of jus cogens norms).
59
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In other words, the lack of a rigorous methodology for determining jus
cogens norms creates the following phenomenon: Advocates unable to
achieve particular policy objectives in American political arenas seek to
achieve their policy objectives by securing pronouncements of international
forums that purport to announce new or expanded peremptory norms so
that these norms may, in turn, be invoked in our courts. The effect of this
end-run around our political institutions is that the source from which jus
cogens norms derive their enduring strength—universal consensus that,
once established, becomes non-derogable—is no longer part of the process
of making law.
The potential list of peremptory norms is apparently limited only by the
imagination of those who would prefer a more robust set of legal
restrictions on state behavior.63 However, not all unpopular or even
deplorable conduct violates international law.64 Peremptory norms
represent an exception to the basic rule that international law is based on the
continuing consent of nation-states—and great expansions of the exception
could threaten to swallow the rule. The further that peremptory norms
move away from the fundamental threats to international peace and
security that form the core of jus cogens, such as genocide and slavery, the
less regard countries may have for that core.65

See, e.g., Justin D. Cummins, Invigorating Labor: A Human Rights Approach in the United
States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 40-41 (2005) (speculating that the “doctrine of jus cogens
provides a potentially powerful path for prosecuting Civil-and Political-Covenant claims, and
it could be a more effective vehicle than the [ATS] and Section 1983 combined,” and concluding
that the doctrine “plainly should apply” to “the right to unionize and other crucial labor
protections. . . .”); Ladan Askari, Girls’ Rights Under International Law: An Argument for
Establishing Gender Equality as a Jus Cogens, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 3, 8 (1998) (“The
set of established peremptory norms . . . can be extended to include a prohibition of gender
discrimination.”). I cite these examples not in any way to discourage furthering the interests
addressed in the above articles, but to show that the connection between proposed expansions
of jus cogens norms and the traditional principles behind such norms, such as universality and
specificity, is not always clear.
64
As Judge Friendly observed:
We cannot subscribe to [the] view that the Eighth Commandment “Thou
shalt not steal” is part of the law of nations. While every civilized nation
doubtless has this as a part of its legal system, a violation of the law of
nations arises only when there has been “a violation by one or more
individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the
relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state,
and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in dealings
inter se.”
IIT v. Vencap, LTD, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp.
292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)); see also Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249-50 (2003).
65
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485,
537-38 (2002):
63
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Because principles of customary international law generally, and jus
cogens norms in particular, are difficult to identify, they are vulnerable to
manipulation. In determining customary international law, judges
increasingly are asked to rely on asserted “international opinion” drawn
from the domestic political trends in some preferred states rather than the
universal, actual practice of states in their relations with one another. In
addition, some commentators try to shape or direct the law by asserting
supposed rules of customary international law that are grounded in vague
pronouncements by international organizations or foreign tribunals rather
than in the specific international practices of nation-states.
I do not suggest that academic students of international law should not
play a role in the development of the law or legal institutions; quite the
contrary. Nor do I take issue with judges who, in good faith, look to
academic writings and adopt the interpretations of particular scholars when
identifying and applying customary international law to real-world
disputes. But all of us, especially judges, should be wary of normative
scholarship in an area of the law that is supposed to be based on the consent
and actual practices of nation-states.
The misuse of international law will invariably lead to cynicism and
breed resistance to the very idea of international law, giving credence to the
criticism of international law noted by Isaiah Berlin, that international law
simply “does not exist.”66
We rely upon the rigor of the common law style of adjudication and the
integrity of our judges to prevent the misuse of customary international law.
None of us should wish to live under a law that is merely a statement of the
personal preferences or visions of justice of tenured law professors or
tenured judges. A claim under customary international law asserted in our
courts should only be based on a violation of “well-established, universally
recognized norms” governing relations between states.67 To preserve the
integrity of customary international law, we must strive to find it in a
As a normative matter, it may be difficult to justify the placement of
capital punishment for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old murderers in the
same category as genocide, slavery, and torture. Indeed, there is a
danger that the “shock the conscience” nature of the jus cogens concept
will be undermined by expanding the category in this way. Although this
observation obviously depends to some extent on a subjective assessment,
the behavior of nations appears to bear it out.
Id. For examples of cases where courts rejected expansive jus cogens norms, see supra note 62.
66
See Szasz, supra note 2, at 60.
67
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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“rigorous, systematic, or legal manner,” and we must avoid the assertion of
“rules” of customary international law that are supported only by
“amorphous, general principles.”68
As a general rule, international law, in its various manifestations, rests
on the consent of sovereign nation-states. Customary international law is
comprised of the well-established, universal practices of sovereign nationstates in their relations with one-another, not merely practices universally
adopted by states.69
If customary international law becomes completely unmoored from the
basic principle of consent by sovereign states in their relations with one
another—in other words, if it becomes wholly detached from the idea of
consent of the governed—it risks losing legitimacy.
If courts abandon the principle of consent, and find law where none
exists—for example, on the basis of views of scholars or the recurring
proclamations of public and private organizations not expressly authorized
by treaty to make law—the result is predictable: our elected officials will
seek to regain their rightful roles as the makers of foreign policy and the
representatives of the popular will. The very idea of customary
international law may be discredited, and the talismanic defense of “judicial
independence” will then ring hollow.
Those who wish the United States well in an international system based
on law should be especially anxious to assure that international law is not
brought into disrepute by its misuse. Americans across the political
spectrum, Democrats and Republicans alike, treasure the survival of the
United States as a sovereign and independent country. And if historical
circumstance and fortune have made the United States a world power with
friends and allies that deserve our support and protection, it is likewise
clear that Americans wish it to be so.
If the United States is to remain, in Lincoln’s words, “the last, best hope
of earth,”70 we should happily recognize that the international legal
obligations enforced against the United States, or successfully asserted by
litigants in the courts of the United States, are generally those legal
obligations that the United States has freely assumed in its relations with

Flores, 414 F.3d at 252 (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re
Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
69
See supra note 64.
70
Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 688 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
68
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other states—those legal obligations to which the United States has
knowingly consented—under its democratic system of government.
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